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Working for two bosses: exploring the paradox of interned student labour in 
China 
Chris Smith and Jenny Chan 
Abstract 
In China there has been a trend for employers to recruit student interns for regular 
employment. In research reported here teachers follow their “student-workers” into 
the factory and become a teacher-supervisor, co-managing the utilisation of their 
labour services. Teachers receive a second salary for their work. This means within 
such factories interns are subject to dual or double controls from supervisors and 
teachers to ensure that the students complete each day of labour, and the contract 
between school and factory is completed and repeated. Students enrolled within 
vocational schools are interned to suit the needs of employers, and not the needs of 
the student. They are moved without consent into internships on a mass scale. 
Moreover, internships are not related to their area of study, invalidating the basic 
principle of vocational education, which is to combine theory and practice within an 
occupationally-focused education programme. The paper draws from research on 
students and teachers’ experience of one employer, and explores the contradictions 
within this internship system for economic development in China and the bargain 
between student and society represented by this new pattern. Theoretically it 
argues that student-interns need to be seen as new category of forced labour in 
China. 
 
Key Words: student-workers; internships; China; labour control 
Introduction 
Chinese student-workers do not choose a placement for their internships from vocational 
schools – it is a collective decision made between schools, corporations and local states. 
Student-workers are ‘dispatched’ for a fixed period (1 or 2 semesters) and their internship is 
increasingly disconnected with what the individual wishes to do – it is not part of pre-
employment experience necessary for CV building for the job the individual desires to 
pursue. In the factory the student-worker performs like a regular worker – is ‘part of the 
team’. Employment is not based on consent – something central to free waged labour; but 
has characteristics of forced or involuntary labour. The practice is on a mass scale, with local 
states, schools and corporations involved in creating mass internships relations. The primary 
identity of the student-worker is as student, and not worker – which has these implications : 
a) work relations and employment relations, which are separated as the student performing 
in the labour process as a worker but without legal status as worker, with important 
implications for employment and labour rights; b) the student has a temporary stay and 
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short-term view of the placement – if they wanted to work as regular workers in the 
particular workplace they could have done this without the need for an internship, and 
hence the internships contradicts or undermines educational training, confidence and 
capability of the student (Sayer, 2007: 31), using up precious time, energy and resources, 
without being directly preparatory for future employment. Moreover, as teachers follow the 
student-workers and becomes a teacher-supervisor in the factory to bring dual controls, 
ensuring that the student completes each day of labour, and the contract between school 
and factory is completed and repeated.  In this sense it is not like doing part-time work 
which many students do to support themselves or their families, because it is chosen by 
others to fulfil the attainment of educational credentials and the threat of blocking 
graduation is a sanction to discipline the student-worker if they refuse an internship. In this 
sense capitalist social relations reach inside the classroom, transforming students into 
workers, and teachers into supervisors. 
Mobility Power and internships 
Situating internships in labour process theory, we argue following Smith (2006) that workers 
possess two powers: mobility and effort power. Characteristic of waged labour within a 
capitalist economy, workers have control over where to sell their labour power, and how 
much effort to apply when working. Around these dual freedoms, both employers and 
workers strategise to maximise their interests. Employers try to control the utilisation of 
labour power once hired, and manage the mobility of labour through both retention and 
dismissal policies. Similarly workers try to maximise training and development opportunities 
to ensure their labour power remains ‘marketable’ (maintaining their mobility power) and 
that their work effort is within reasonable norms or standards. A “constant flow of different 
individuals through a labour process creates problems when individual differences have a 
material effect on productivity or profitability for the employer” (Smith, 2006: 408). Hence, 
the incentives to regularise labour capture and retention for employers and employment 
security and ‘fixity’ for workers exists because of the costs of movement for both parties. 
But the costs of flow have been declining, as the availability of a global labour pool expands, 
competition between workers increases, capital movement and trade grows, education and 
training levels standardise and shared technologies reduce barriers to movement (Smith, C., 
2010). The idea of labour power as a ‘resource’ is a misreading of the appearance of such 
fixity or stability as human capital, because the individual ownership of mobility power by 
the worker ensures any stay with a particular employer or occupation or skill is always 
dependent on an exchange bargain – over work effort and mobility opportunities (that is 
opportunities to increase the value of labour power, through training, development, career 
progression etc) that the exchange facilitates. It is also subject to the human life cycle, which 
means workers behaving in different ways at different times of their working life – more job 
changes when young, fewer when middle aged for example. These are qualities that are 
inherently human, and hence do not apply to fixed capital (Smith, C., 2010).  
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The internship system developing in China aims to transfer the mobility power from the 
possession of the student-worker, to other agents, especially schools and large employers. 
This creates what can be called coerced or ‘institutionalised forced-labour’ – highlighting the 
lack of consent central to free waged labour, as collective agencies, such as local states, 
schools and corporations, are mobilised at the level of society to direct the supply of 
student-workers to the labour process. We use the phrase ‘student-workers’ alongside 
‘interns’ to signal the fact that there is no special pre-employment training associated with 
working as a student-worker in the research reported here. With regard to effort power 
control has been enhanced in the factory with teachers being transformed into quasi-
supervisors, responsible, as we discuss below, for ensuring student-interns turn up on time 
for work, and apply themselves competitively across the working day. The student workers 
are treated as ‘regular workers’, receiving limited or no training during their internship 
period which is formally planned as a continuation of their vocational training. Hence within 
these mass-industrial internships, the dispatched student-workers are working to fulfil the 
needs of the student identity (to graduate from school) and not their worker-identity (to sell 
their labour power through mutual and free exchange with an employer). We argue that the 
Chinese internship system as reported here creates contradictions for the motivations of 
sellers of labour power and buyers, and this has implications for the way student-workers 
view work, resist and struggle within the labour process. 
Traditional internships are linked to difficult to enter occupations in professions and creative 
industries where they are used as pre-employment preparation (Fasang, 2006; Banks, 2007; 
Caldwell, 2008; Ashley, 2010). Recent work on creative industries has highlighted the open-
ended nature of these internships, which do not necessarily lead to a job after a fixed 
period, but rather an ‘extended entry tournament’ that lacks a definite finish (Stoyanova 
and Grugulis, 2012). While there is often a disconnect between the types of work performed 
during internships and the desired job or occupation of the internee (especially in 
professions and creative industries), at a minimum the sector worked in is the one that the 
internee wishes to enter and action in choosing the internship remains voluntary. 
Internships are also linked to transition from school to work, and apprenticeship 
programmes, where there is considerable international diversity in the effectiveness of 
internships in delivering successful outcomes for internees (Lehmann, 2005). Internships can 
increase “personal and social efficacy”, increasing “self confidence” and decreasing negative 
attitudes (Beinstein, 1976). Comparative research on students with and without internship 
experience strongly endorse the positive of internships for reducing time to enter the labour 
market, increasing remuneration for first jobs and enhancing overall job satisfaction (Gault 
et al., 2000). Vickie Smith (2010: 292) noted that even working in unpaid internships have 
indirect benefits as they “allow people to develop human, cultural, and social capital – 
technical, organizational, and interactional skills, and connections – and an opportunity to 
‘prove’ that they are high-quality workers.” But this is only the case where internships are 
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voluntary, pre-employment training that have a connection between the occupation or 
industry of the placement and the employment field desired by the young worker.  
Theoretically internship is voluntary pre-employment training, where the young worker 
makes sacrifices (often working for no or low pay) in exchange for additions to their labour 
power in the form of training, experience and know-how to enhance the market value of 
labour power for the young worker or to gain potential access to work opportunities within 
the internal market of the organisation. There are clearly deferred financial gains flowing to 
internees from this arrangement. Motivation of interned labour is high because there is a 
willingness to exchange long hours, low or no pay for the gains of pre-employment 
experience with the end gain of employment with a chosen occupation, employer or sector. 
The motivation for the employer of taking on interned labour is that it is useful screening or 
selection, it can add to flexibility of the workforce and it keeps existing employees aware of 
the labour market. In order to maintain the supply of labour, promises of future 
employment need to be real.  
When this exchange promise is broken or absent, then there is problem with this model. 
Recently the transitional feature of internship in acting as a stepping stone into work for the 
young has been broken, (Perlin, 2010; Smith, V., 2010), as the supply of student interns 
outweighs places available, and interns are not engaged in a “pre-employment exchange” 
but locked into long-term or rotating internships (Stoyanova and Grugulis, 2012). The 
employability agenda is also lengthening the time taken to find employment, as the burden 
of this falls on the individual and risks of finding work grow (Smith, V. 2010). Even, in 
countries with more institutionalised labour markets (such as Japan) there are also 
problems with VET (Vocational Education Training), as colleges traditionally locked into 
supply lines for local firms are increasingly failing to deliver the places required to absorb 
the numbers of students coming out of the Colleges. In Japan recent research shows a 
falling percentage of students placed in companies following internships, and rising in 
numbers of students having to find their own internships and jobs outside of the traditional 
institutional web (Hori, 2009). The situation in Germany remains one where the transition 
between school and work is more integrated and institutionalised between, school, 
employers, trade unions and young people. Vocational education is institutionalised, giving 
certainty around education and employment, but at the cost of inflexibility –“flexibility for 
most of the German apprentices was also curtailed by their earlier placement into one of 
the lower secondary education streams, which limits their access to high quality 
apprenticeship positions and puts higher post-secondary education virtually out of reach.” 
(Lehmann, 2005: 123). This is in contrast to more disjointed transitions in liberal market 
capitalist countries like Canada, the UK and US (Lehmann, 2005).   
There is increasingly a disjuncture between vocational education and demand from 
employers, as the economics of colleges change from state funding to student fee income, 
and colleges are forced to expand popular courses as ‘commodities to sell to students’ 
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rather than as part of an integrated capitalism, where educational credentials, training and 
expertise were managed by the college for the employer, and the balance of supply and 
demand was maintained by regular state funding and close partnerships between colleges 
and local employers. This has changed to neo-liberalism, with a disjuncture between 
education and work (Mok et al 2009). 
Internships in China 
China’s contemporary educational reform emphasizes the expansion of vocational 
education in the service of social and economic development and student internship has 
become an indispensable component (Durden and Yang, 2006; Murphy and Johnson, 2009). 
Building on earlier industrial training and elementary schooling foundations, the post-Mao 
government expanded access to education with the goal of advancing the “four 
modernizations,” that is, agriculture, industry, defense, and science and technology. Upon 
completing nine years’ compulsory education, eligible students can either continue their 
studies in the general track high schools or enroll in vocational institutions. The admission 
age for standard three-year vocational education is often 15 to 16. At present more than 21 
million full-time students are enrolled in vocational schools (not including those in 
vocational colleges or adult vocational education). The ten-year outline of China’s national 
plan for education reform and development projects an increase in vocational school 
enrollment from 21.79 million in 2009 to 23.5 million in 2020 (China Central Government, 
2010). A comparable decline in the number of students in high schools is planned. While 
students in high schools are prepared for university entrance examination, those in 
vocational schools are trained for skilled work or higher vocational education. 
Woronov (2012: 707) states that vocational education has changed from an institutionalised 
supply line for state owned jobs to one where the individual students have to fend for 
themselves:  
Vocational secondary schools are not new in China. Originating in the Mao era, 
vocational schools were originally established to train midlevel bureaucrats and 
technocrats for the urban work unit system. Until the early to mid-1990s, graduates 
of secondary vocational programs were funnelled directly into lifelong employment 
in the state sector, where they formed a respected management strata. Today, 
however, as the state sector shrinks under reform-era privatization policies, far 
fewer vocational graduates are posted directly into iron rice bowl jobs. Instead, the 
majority must seek employment in the private job market. 
Traditional apprenticeship in China meant three year vocational training, with a 
placement/internship in the third year following two years classroom study. Like all 
vocational education it followed the principle of “theory into practice”, a period of class-
room study within structured career orientated course followed by a period of internship 
closely linked to the programme of study (Qiu, 1988). This gave employers certainty that the 
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students they received had been pre-selected by the school, that they were theoretically 
trained and job-focused. For the student it meant a predictable and practical training with 
greater certainty of employment at the end of the course. The students in this research 
reported the internships taking place at any time over the three years, and hence a loss of 
control the over timing of internship for student. More critically, there is a disconnection 
between theory and practice, with placements being unrelated to the course studied by the 
student. Further, the internships length seemed to fit the seasonal and flexible production 
needs of the employer and not the learning cycle of the vocational course. Hence the 
internship is no longer controlled by the student, but rather there is structured by 
employers, local authorities and vocational schools.  
There is increased complexity and uncertainty: 
The degree structure of vocational education is complex, and is changing rapidly. In 
general, most secondary vocational schools in both rural and urban areas offer a three-
year (zhongzhuan) programme. These normally include two years of classroom work 
that combine general secondary education with technical training in the specific field. 
Most schools also offer some kind of apprenticeship (shixi) for part or all of the final 
year, although in our experience these are extremely informal and vary widely from 
student to student. In addition, some schools now also offer five-year secondary degrees 
that result in a higher certification (dazhuan), based on four years of course work and 
one year of apprenticeship (Hansen and Woronov, 2012: 6). 
In an urban school studied by Woronov, the vocational school was funded by the local 
authority and had traditionally supplied skilled worker and technician levels to the same 
local authority – but these skills had been degraded to “low-level functionaries” such as 
ticket sellers for the local subway, but nevertheless there was job linked study: “This school 
offers three-year secondary vocational (zhongzhuan) degrees, and its marketing lure to 
incoming students was precisely its links to the municipal government.”(Hansen and 
Woronov, 2012: 7). Woronov’s study of two Nanjing vocational education schools 
emphasises a misalignment between the content of the classroom study, and the actual jobs 
the students ended up doing. For example, “the “subway” program at the Bridge School, 
students dozed through a year of lectures on the engineering principles behind building 
subway tunnels and designing subway car engines [and] after graduating, they would be 
assigned jobs as ticket sellers, station cleaners, and security guards in the municipal subway 
system” (Woronov, 2012: 709). Or “the students studying bookkeeping at the Canal School 
spent hours perfecting their skills using an abacus, a device no longer used in Chinese 
businesses. After graduation they would find work as cashiers” (ibid 709). The 
‘academicisation’ of vocational courses Woronov suggests was part of the ‘value added’ to 
the human capital investments made by the students and their parents. We think this is a 
general process, when vocational education and employers needs separate through market 
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forces. But the specific interventions of large firms in creating interned ‘student labour’ also 
needs to enter this equation between VET and employers. 
What is emphasised in research reported here is not that the individual student is somehow 
a free agent to select their future employment, but rather that, the local state, vocational 
schools (public and for profit private schools) and large private firms have intervened in the 
educational supply lines such that ‘student-interns’ are converted into a new category of 
‘student-labour’ dispatched en mass to large employers to fit into production needs of the 
company not the educational needs of the individual student. Woronov (2012: 708) argues 
that schools are commodifying education, selling courses to aspirational students (and their 
parents) such that “students thus become consumers, purchasing a promise for their 
future—that vocational education will be a kind of investment in their human capital, which 
they then can cash in by finding a decent job after graduation.” But what requires emphasis 
is the growing forced nature of this sale; as vocational schools sign contracts with large firms 
to ‘supply’ interns on a mass scale, irrespective of the nature of the educational course 
studied by the student or the individual student’s wishes for their industrial placement. 
In China it was not always possible to find an exact match between courses studied and 
company or occupational preference of the student, but that there was always an effort to 
do this (Qiu, 1988). But now there has been a change, with vocational schools expanding 
and supplying students on an industrial mass scale, for periods of internships that suit the 
companies not the student, and on work that is parallel to regular work of permanent 
workers. Teachers, instead of remaining in schools and monitoring the quality of the 
placements for students from a distance, are now incorporated and paid as supervisory 
labour, ‘caring’ and controlling the labour power of interned student labour inside the 
factory. Student interns are being integrated into the workforce as ‘permanent’ part of the 
peripheral workforce – up to 15 percent of the workforce at the case study site. Under these 
conditions the old understanding of the function of internship is being challenged. 
Within the terms of our framework, the mobility power of student-workers is more 
constrained than in the case of migrant or local workers – who are able to voluntarily quit 
and find better employment opportunities with other employers. Labour turnover is an 
endemic problem in China, and has been a significant driver of workers income, as exits or 
job hopping replaces voice as the main means of bargaining for disenfranchised workers, 
with a central union functioning in the interest of employers and not workers (Lee, 2007; 
Jiang et al., 2009; Cooke, 2012). Labour mobility is often the only freedom available to 
young workers: 
After graduation, the new graduates exercised their flexibility by moving to better 
jobs (“jumping feeding troughs” [tiaocao] in contemporary slang), sometimes as 
often as every two to three weeks. They jumped for different reasons, not just more 
for money or better opportunity for mobility. Sometimes they found a job slightly 
closer to home. At other times they left to avoid a growing conflict with a co-worker, 
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or to find a nicer boss, or even because they found better food at the company-
provided lunches. Although this behaviour seems capricious or even irrational by 
standards of human capital accumulation, there is, as Susan Willis [1998] notes, a 
particular logic to jumping jobs. By doing so, these young people are exercising the 
only real power they have in this economy: the power to quit (Woronov, 2011: 96). 
Moreover, the dormitory labour system (Smith, 2003; Pun and Smith, 2007) in China 
facilitates mobility and turnover, as the constraints of rents/mortgages and private housing 
are absent in the ubiquitous provision of industrial dormitories to house factory workers. 
Movement is freer compared to local labour markets where work opportunities are 
geographically constrained by travel-to-work times – despite these being extended (Smith, 
C., 2010: 272). But in the case of student-workers, the state, school and company operate a 
‘spatial fix’ (Harvey, 1982) on labour power, preventing the exercise of mobility power by 
students. To pass exams, students need to complete internships, but students do not 
choose. Legally, students are not workers but ‘internees’ in this sense the freedom of 
movement that the labour law provides does not apply to them, and therefore this legally 
constrains movement. Schools judge teachers on performance – keeping students in work – 
this involves daily monitoring of attendance and moral, social and educational threats to 
keep them in the factory and on the job. 
Theoretically, if one dimension of labour power is constrained in this way, the other 
dimension should compensate. If mobility is more controlled by the employer, workers will 
compensate by reducing effort – through go-slows, sabotages, absenteeism, misbehaviour – 
largely informal but nevertheless collective expressions of ‘effort restraint’ to compensate 
for tight management control over mobility power. Students can’t quit (easily), so they will 
reduce or withdraw effort and good will; they will not behave because work is presented to 
them as a coercive and no-consensual exchange, which infringes the basic rules of 
capitalism, that waged labour has a formally voluntary not forced nature, and capitalist 
labour markets facilitate free circulation of labour around the system based on mutually 
agreed rules of exchange – however much this description is an ideal, not real one, interned 
student labour is delivered to the employer without consent as traditionally understood. 
Student interns cannot quit, but they also have problems regulating hours at work. Night 
work and overtime work is not within their control, and this again infringes ideas of consent 
and agreement, and builds resentment and disillusionment. They will ‘play up’ (see forms of 
resistance below). While effort restraint is attempted there is also pressure on student 
workers’ effort powers as they are new and green labour – inexperienced, temporary, 
psychologically or subjectively divided from other workers by virtue of being ‘student 
interns’ without legal, social and collective bonds of solidarity with regular workers who 
have ‘consented’ to work for the case study company. Student interns interviewed for this 
research dreamed of returning to the classroom; to other workplaces aligned to their area 
of study, and as such their consciousness was fractured and not integrated into the new 
migrant working class in the mass assembly factories. The pressures when mobility power 
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and effort power are controlled by multiple powers – line managers, teachers, state 
officials, parents – can lead to dysfunctional outcomes – such as suicides and self harm – 
both reported in concentrated numbers at companies which employ large numbers of 
student interns. Student labour turns inwards, if the legitimated forms of resistance 
(quitting, voice and effort restraint) are closed off. 
Research Methods  
The paper is based on fieldwork conducted in concentrated bursts over a two year period, 
and involving interviews and document gathering, alongside participation by one of the 
writers in a NGO campaign for social justice on behalf of migrant workers and student-
workers. Interviews were conducted in dormitories or spaces outside of the production 
process. One of the researchers stayed in the industrial dormitories with the student 
interns, and through this process got to know the respondents very well, and using this 
ethnographic approach, immersed herself in the life of the students, including trips into 
town away from the factories. Through this process, trust and a rich picture of the working 
life of these internees was built up. 
During fieldwork 38 formal student interns were interviewed using a semi-structured 
format. These were all taped and have been transcribed. They varied in length, from one to 
several hours. The students were on internships at the same company, a giant contract 
manufacturing and assembler with factories across China. Informants came from several 
sites – two in Longhua and Guanlan Towns, Shenzhen (Guangdong), and the others at 
Chengdu (Sichuan) and Chongqing. In addition to students, 14 teachers working at the same 
factories were also interviewed using the same method. In December 2011, six government 
education officials and corporate human resources managers in charge of school-business 
cooperation and internship programs were interviewed to learn more about the student 
internships administered by governments and schools at the factories. Interviews revealed 
that the student interns were pursuing a wide range of majors including arts, music, 
automotive repair, petro-chemistry, preschool education, Chinese herbal medicine, 
horticulture, village administrative and economic management, secretarial services, 
logistics, business management, sales and marketing, hotel and tourism, graphic design and 
many more. Even the students in electronics and mechanics – perhaps especially these 
students – had very different expectations about internship training at the workplace from 
what they encountered on the assembly line of the case study company. 
Vocational Schools and Institutionalised student labour supply 
Vocational schools offer employment-oriented courses for students in their first and second 
years. During their third year, students are to intern at enterprises that are directly relevant 
to their studies. In a statement to the media on 10th October 2010, Foxconn a giant contract 
manufacturing firms said “Interns currently comprise 7.6% of our total employee population 
in China and at no time has this percentage ever exceeded 15% even during the summer 
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peak seasons when more students want to enrol in the internship program” (Foxconn, 
2010).  According to the “Regulations on the Management of Vocational School Student 
Internship,” issued by the Ministries of Education and Finance in June 2007, internship is an 
integral part of vocational education and “shall be in line with the curriculum and learning 
objective” (Article 3). When interned in the workplace, interns are not entitled to 
employment contracts, which define labor relations under the Labor Contract Law (effective 
1 January 2008). However, prior to an internship, the students, the school and the 
enterprise are obligated to sign a written agreement making clear each side’s 
responsibilities, rights and duties (Article 10). Employers are also required to pay interns for 
their labor (Article 8).  
Through the mechanism of internships, employers gain access to a flexible reserve army of 
vocational school student labour of more than 21 million. Whereas the law specifies that 
vocational students should do internships during the final year of studies, at the case study 
company students were interned earlier than is legally allowed (that is, in their first and 
second years). Sichuan’s Chengdu Industrial Vocational and Technical School, the product of 
the 2010 merger of six schools, is China’s largest public school, with 20,000 full-time and 
10,000 part-time students. Its educational aspirations are being “number one in Sichuan 
province, number one in China, international acclaim.” In June 2011, the school notified 
parents of the entire first-year class: 
According to the “Chengdu city directive to vocational schools to further the pursuit 
of moral cultivation to lay a foundation for the job market through activities that 
expose students to industry,” during this year’s summer vacation our school will 
organize students enrolled in 2010 who are at least 16 years old to go to [Case study] 
Chengdu Company and participate in an internship. 
Regardless of whether the student was majoring in construction, automotive repair, fine 
arts or whatever, the summer Internship plan was applied and continued the following year. 
The school’s educational mission is: “Unification of school and business, unification of 
theory and practice, unification of teacher and technician, and unification of student and 
employee.” According to the interviewed students, only the first goal was accomplished, 
and that only from the perspective of the company, that is, the combination of school and 
business through the supply of students en masse in the name of the internship. 
Student experiences  
Research on student’s expectations for employment while studying in vocational schools 
conducted by Woronov suggests that they were ‘realistic’ about the type of jobs they could 
achieve, and that they “saw through” the hype of the Schools:  
Although the schools promised that a diploma with the institution’s name on it 
would magically open doors across the city, the students knew better. They would 
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eventually find jobs through a combination of luck, connections, good looks and 
perseverance—not because of skills that they learned in school (Woronov, 2011: 95).  
Many studied not because of any intrinsic interest in working in a particular job or 
occupation, but to gain the status of continuing to be a ‘student’ – something valued in 
China; or to enter the labour market quicker and avoid burdening parents with too much 
education debt. Her detailed ethnographic research of school life is a useful corrective to a 
utilitarian or linear view of vocational education as a win-win for student and society. 
Research reported here encounters students during their placement or internship 
experience, with them reflecting back on their expectations of this against what they had 
been studying in class. And while for some, the internship was simply a way of earning 
additional income, for the majority of the 38 students interviewed, there was a sense of 
disappointment with their internship. It had little relationship to their specific classroom 
studies, was not considered to be adding value to their education, and the pressures, 
intensity and relentlessness of working as a regular worker (but on student pay and status) 
was perceived negatively. Woronov (2011: 96) notes from her research that: “Although 
some were bitter and angry at their schools for teaching them virtually nothing, most of the 
graduating students were resigned to a future of flexible service labor.” The contrast for our 
research was not between poor quality education and poor quality internship, but rather 
more on the low quality of the internship against expectations of internships as a chance to 
marry theory and practice in constructive and integrated fashion.  
Liu Siying, 18, came from Sichuan’s Mianyang city, told us how she became an intern at the 
Shenzhen Longhua factory in the 2011 fall semester. 
This is my final year in electronics and mechanical engineering. I really enjoy 
my studies and have been studying very hard. I even review coursework in 
the school library during summer vacation. My original plan was to seek an 
internship at Huawei Technology but our teacher persuaded my whole class 
of 42 students to intern at [case study Company]. He emphasized that [the 
company] has a worldwide customer base including Huawei and that the 
company is investing billions in high-tech research. In short, he stressed that 
we’d learn a lot through the internship.   
Virtually from day one, however, Siying was “tied to the PCB [printed circuit board] line 
attaching components to the iPad back-casing.” In her words, it “requires no skills or prior 
knowledge.” Although we cannot verify if the internship program offered by Huawei 
Technology would have been any better than that at the case study company, she regretted 
her choice. “During the night shift, whenever I look out in that direction [pointing to the 
west], I see the big fluorescent sign of Huawei shining bright red, and at that moment I feel 
a pain in my heart.” There was a long silence. The south wind blew through the acacia trees 
in the early autumn evening. The Huawei and the case study company headquarters are on 
opposite sides of the Meiguan Expressway in Longhua Town, Shenzhen.” 
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Fieldwork revealed that the student interns were assigned to a one-size-fits-all “internship” 
which involved factory work completely divorced from their studies and interests. In a 
typical response, a 17-year-old student intern told us: 
Come on, what do you think we’d have learned standing for more than ten 
hours a day manning the machines on the line? What’s an internship? There’s 
no relation to what we study in school. Every day is just a repetition of one or 
two simple motions, like a robot. 
There was also the sense of independence that came from earning money and not having to 
rely on parents. Xiao Li (one informant) said, “The only happy thing is that I don’t have to 
ask my parents to send me money.” None of the three interns had been able to save money, 
let alone sending any back home. In the bustling and exciting city of Shenzhen, they 
dreamed of buying new cell phones, singing in karaoke bars, and having fun with new 
friends. Perhaps urban consumption is a way of social life among the young working people, 
and a rebellion against the alienated factory labour. What was certain is that the trio felt 
bored and exhausted at work but still felt that they had to work overtime to earn enough 
money for minimal personal enjoyment. 
Interviews revealed that the top three grievances among the interns were: first, failure of 
the company to provide training in their fields of study; second, sickness due to overwork; 
third, intense work pressure. There was indeed a disjuncture between the so-called 
internship and individual career goals. A student protest took place at the Zhengzhou 
College of Traffic Technicians (Henan province), which was governed by the city-level 
Human Resources and Social Security Bureau. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of students 
“rioted” against forced internships: on 17 June 2010, they vented their anger by setting 
papers and blankets ablaze and throwing fireballs onto the ground of the student dormitory 
at around 10 p.m. The cause of the mass incident was that some 1,000 of the 5,000 students 
were told they would have to intern at the Shenzhen Longhua and Guanlan plants, where 
they were to receive “training;” and the trained students could choose to work in the new 
Zhengzhou factory later that year. The internship was scheduled to begin on 27 June 2010 
and last until 22 January 2011, a seven-month period. The students, in their first year, 
argued that internships at the electronics factory had no relevance to their fields of study. 
Over 85 percent of the students were from rural families, who aspired to become 
technicians and engineers, according to an interviewed teacher.  
Zhengzhou College of Traffic Technicians offers two broad streams of study: automobile 
technology and transport, and information services. According to the school enrollment 
brochure, the three-year program involves two years at school and one year of internship. 
In the fall of 2011, one of us interviewed Li Wei, a 17-year-old student who had enrolled in 
the course of automotive repair in September 2009. “In our first semester we studied Auto 
Body and in the second semester we studied Automatic Transmission,” he said. In a very low 
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tone, he told how he and his classmates were tricked into interning at the case study 
company immediately after the first year exam in June 2010: 
Before we departed for the [case study] plant, our teacher pledged that after the 
internship was completed, he’d make up any remaining specialized classes. In 
January 2011, we finally completed our internship and returned to school. In the 
new semester in February 2011 [the second semester of the second year], the school 
started teaching a class on motors. But then in April, the school began to arrange 
internships at auto plants for graduates. The school had still not finished teaching 
our specialized classes, and they began making internship assignments. We’ve yet to 
complete even the core classes of our specialization, nor have we learned the basic 
skills of automotive repair. How’re we going to do an internship? 
A valuable period of seven months “was completely wasted at [case study],” sighed Wei. 
Joining hands with dozens of fellow classmates, he mustered courage to talk to their 
teacher, but the efforts were futile. “After that, we sought out the senior school 
administrator who told us that we’d have to extend our studies by paying one more year’s 
fee for ‘a higher diploma’ before studying the remaining specialized curriculum.” He 
continued:  
We’re depressed. We’d followed the rules and paid for three years of tuition, but we 
haven’t completed professional training. The school violated the most basic 
agreement, contradicted the student recruitment brochure, arbitrarily changed the 
students’ curriculum, treated its students’ future like a plaything, and failed in its 
responsibility to students. We students didn’t attain sufficient knowledge in our 
education, and come time for employment, we’ll have no competitive advantage. 
This is the consequence of the school’s irresponsibility. 
Wei’s feeling of betrayal, anger and frustration were strong. Vocational schools are required 
to arrange an internship in their field with the students’ consent in the third year, and it is 
against regulations to organize an internship sooner. Internship is an integral part of the 
curriculum and is vital to linking theory with practice. Vocational schools have to compete 
for new students. Internships at big companies are key selling points in the large student 
market. Xie Shumei, said: “Parents want their children to do better, and not have to endure 
hardship. That’s why they even borrowed money to put me in school.” Another student, 
Lintong, was born to a peasant family in rural Henan, the only child. His father is a part-time 
primary school history teacher in a neighboring village. Lintong, who believed that he was 
“not good enough to be admitted to the key high-school in Shangqiu,” cherished studying at 
the 3,000-person vocational school. “Education is most treasured by my parents. When they 
were young, in the 1970s and early 1980s, they didn’t have a chance to go further after 
receiving basic schooling. I can’t let them down.” Lintong, the “qualified” 16-year-old 
interning student, like hundreds of other interns from his school, wasted his valuable time 
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and his tuition fee to work at the case study factory during the summer holiday of 2011 and 
the first semester of his second school year that followed. 
Zhumadian Higher Technical School, with an enrollment of 6,500 students, is directly 
governed by the Human Resources and Social Security Bureau of Henan province. After 
attending the open day in spring 2011, when they learned about a “no tuition” offer, 
Shumei and her friends signed up for the course in the hope of reducing the family burden. 
The school publicity reads: 
The country has good policies: low-income families pay no tuition! 
To look for a job without learning technical skills is a life-long mistake!  
It is best to have a skill in this world, to save you if times get tough!  
For a technically skilled person, the world is wide open, the benefits last a lifetime! 
Shumei and her friends hoped to build a better future than their migrant worker parents 
through acquiring new skills and knowledge. But will they merely be student workers on an 
assembly line in the next year and thereafter? 
Sun Junyi majored in computer-assisted tool making; under pressure from the school, he 
was redirected from a planned internship at an automobile plant and sent to the case study 
company during his final year of study. On the line, he was doing “trivial tasks like checking 
product screens and cleaning the LCD [liquid crystal display] surface.” In childhood he set a 
goal to become a skilled technician to “lead a team of tool makers in a modern Toyota plant 
in Shanghai.” He was frustrated at “repeating the same boring work all day.”  This story was 
repeated by the majority of those interviewed. 
Teachers – the paradox of incorporation into control  
Zhang Lintong’s teacher announced that all vocational schools in the central China’s Henan 
province had to cooperate with local government to send students to our surveyed 
electronics factory through internships. Lintong testified, “Unless we could present a 
medical report certified by the city hospital that we were very ill, we had to depart 
immediately.” For most of the interviewed student interns, assembly work is irrelevant to 
their studies and they were keenly aware that it is a violation of the concept of internships 
that are supposed to provide an integral part of their schooling. 
During fieldwork in at the case study site in Chengdu, we learned that the company paid 
teachers to co-supervise the interning students. Teachers received two paychecks, one from 
their schools and the other from the company. They received 2,000 Yuan/month (US$320) 
for normal work time in 2011-12 at the Chengdu facility. Teachers were requested to report 
for duty to the administrative office from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. during weekdays, not on 
weekends or at night. Their main duty was to monitor the attendance of their students. 
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They had access to student attendance records via the company intranet, which lists the 
students’ punch-in time at the start of the work shift, punch-in time after meals, punch-in 
time for overtime work, and punch-out time at the end of the shift. As a result, they could 
react swiftly to cases of “missing students.” In some circumstances, the teachers checked 
student’s sick leave application and decided whether to approve it. In the eyes of interns, 
the teachers were perceived as “part of factory management”, as this respondent 
explained: 
The real reason our teachers are here to guide us is out of fear that we will want to 
quit, so they will work with those of us who are moody and advise us to stay. They 
also come forward to fix behavioral or disciplinary problems. We have a 
troublemaker. A boy came from our school; he loved to go online, you know 24 
hours on his Play station, at the dorm. He went online, played the video games, and 
didn’t go to work for two days. Our teacher thought that he was sick but then caught 
him. He received a written warning.  
In cases where students were in fact ill, due to overwork and stress on the line, neither 
company supervisors nor teachers seemed to be available for help when interning female 
students most needed it. Parents and siblings at best offered suggestions by telephone, such 
as the purchase of pain killers or antibiotics for sore throat and minor infections. 
Wang Meiyi, 16, suffered menstrual disorders when she was assigned to the packaging 
workshop at the Chengdu plant. On a chilly morning in December 2011, she asked if the 
researcher could take her to see a doctor as we walked in the local neighborhood shopping 
strip. She recalled, “I used to have relatively regular menstrual periods, but this time my 
period was delayed until the first week in October. I was frightened. I had cramps so severe 
that I was covered with sweat on the line, where it’s air-conditioned.” In November and 
December, Meiyi’s irregularity and pain persisted. Her line leader was a young man with 
whom she did not feel comfortable talking about the “girl matter.” “I also did not report my 
sickness to Teacher Tan … for the same kind of embarrassment.” “At school, we only have 
six classes a day, and I got good rest. But here [at the factory] it’s different: we don’t have 
breaks whenever we’re behind on the production targets. And it’s no use to complain to my 
teacher.” 
In order for longer-term internships not affect “teaching,” in some cases school tests were 
actually taken to the factory in order that students to be tested after work. A student 
interviewee said: “A teacher came with the test papers and administered the test. What was 
laughable was that we did not even have books, the teacher brought one copy and we just 
copied the book; that counted as our test.”  
Teachers motivated and encouraged their students. For example, a teacher allayed the fears 
of students who were exposed to the radioactive environment at work.  
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I explained to my students that the radioactivity at the company is well within safety 
standards, it’s just like the modest [radioactive] level of a cell phone. It’s not 
dangerous. Take a moment to think about the selflessness of the scientists and the 
medical teams when Japan reported the tragic radiation leak this March [2011]. 
None of the Japanese withdrew from rescue work. So, every one of us should take 
responsibility for the good of humanity.  
With their own teachers slighting basic dangers such as radioactivity, incidents of work-
related injuries and diseases among interns were difficult to report. 
A teacher had some students who were reluctant to go to work during the first week they 
arrived at the company and he patiently counseled them. 
I asked my students to manage their emotions. Calm down. Think carefully if you 
want to leave – won’t your parents be disappointed? I visited my students in the 
dorm to see if they felt okay on Tuesday night. They answered ‘not too bad.’ I met 
them again on Friday night. They said ‘fine.’ They’ve gradually got used to the work 
rhythm. Finally I asked if they want to go. They replied ‘no.’  
Maintaining a high retention rate of the students was a primary criterion for judging teacher 
performance. In the unambiguous statement of Teacher Chong Ming said:  “We don’t 
educate our students about labor rights; otherwise, we won’t be able to keep them.” Only 
self-protection from workplace sexual harassment was discussed. In one case, the teachers 
held the line-leader responsible for repeatedly harassing a girl student-worker.  
During the internship, student applications for sick leave were routinely rejected even when 
there were compelling reasons. The dormitory labor system replaced a freer school 
environment with a high-pressure factory regime. Instead of acquiring useful knowledge 
toward their various specializations, the interns were placed on the line and ordered to 
build iPads for excessively long shifts of 10-12 hours, dealing a blow particularly to those 
who had high self-esteem and ambitious career objectives. The repetitive manual tasks 
were mind numbing. On several assembly lines, verbal insults toward the interns by line 
leaders only made the situation worse. The entire month of night shift work in October 
2011, and the interns’ subjection to forced overtime up to 6 to 7 days a week was simply 
“too much” (this followed the day shift in September, the beginning month of the 
internship). 
On 1 November 2011, a conflict erupted between Han Chinese and Tibetan student interns. 
Nearly two dozen interns from “a number of schools” got into a fistfight during working 
hours. All were laid off, while some others, fearing retaliation, left on the grounds of 
personal security. The spontaneous, mass incident sounded an alarm, so that a vice principal 
from the Pujiang Vocational School (in Pujiang county, southwestern Sichuan) arrived at the 
scene the next day to “look after his students.” The case company demanded that the 
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school immediately “take back the bad students.” The dual control over the interning 
students exercised by school and enterprise became transparent in the course of managing 
the crisis, pulling aside the curtain on practices that had been presented as “self-
development and training.” We would also suggest that such action did guarantee that 
students would be removed from oppressive internships. 
An even more dubious practice was covering up child labour under the cloak of student 
internship. In September 2012, when a new school semester began, the electronics factory 
used underage students as workers to manufacture game consoles at its Yantai plant, the 
largest industrial employer in Shandong province. Among the thousands of student interns, 
56 of them were below the legal minimum of 16 years of age, with the youngest at 14. 
Teachers arranged the very young students, even those in the first semester of their first 
year of studies, to intern at the Yantai factory. The hidden issue of child workers was made 
public when an intern, born in December 1997, approached one of the researchers for help. 
Punching in at 7:40 p.m. he said, “Whenever the work is done is when you get off your 
shift”. The underage interns were racing against time to meet the precise production targets 
of Nintendo’s Wii U play stations. 
Analysis 
There is a need for more research to evaluate the employer’s perspective on increasing the 
use of interned student labour as part of the ‘core’ or regular workforce in China. From 
research reported here, we have the views of students, teachers and some managers, but 
further research is required before more robust conclusions can be made. However, we can 
speculate about the timing of the new practice, which correlates with rising wages and 
improved employment regulation for regular workers in China. Being outside employment 
law, having flexible access to work and being cheaper to employ, may be some of the 
advantages employers receive from using student interns, which combined with the quick 
delivery of the institutionalised character of their supply to the factories, can outweigh the 
disadvantages that can flow from using young workers who have not formally consented or 
chosen their internship. These disadvantages are around work effort, motivation and morale 
– the negatives that flow from workers whose mobility power has been hugely constrained 
by employers, and in case of student-interns, by vocational schools and local authorities as 
well. 
Addressing the question of what employers in China like the one reported here are getting 
from student-labour, there are five reasons.  
Firstly, student-workers offer flexible labour to fit the demand cycles in the electronics 
sector (with May-December being the hot season). Student interns are easier to recruit and 
cheaper to remove. Student interns are the disposable workers that managers in the flexible 
factory seek to effortlessly respond to corporate demands for rush orders. Unlike regular 
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employees, interns can be laid off without 30 days’ prior notice, which maximizes company 
flexibility to respond to the ebb and flow of orders. Since interns are not legally defined as 
labourers, they are barred from trade union membership and protection. While the case 
study company provides its rural migrant and local workers with labour contracts, it does 
not establish a three-party agreement with its interning students and the schools. At the 
case company student interns were subjected to the same treatment as regular workers 
including alternating day and night shifts monthly and extensive overtime, defying the letter 
and the spirit of the education law. With reference to the 2007 Regulations (Article 5, 
“Interns shall not work more than eight hours a day”) and the 2010 Education Circular 
(Clause 4, “Interns shall not work overtime beyond the eight-hour workday”), the common 
understanding is that the maximum eight-hour internship training ought to take place 
during daytime to ensure the interning students’ safety and physical and mental health. 
Chinese Labour law provides stronger protection and the requirement for written labour 
contracts, social security, welfare, prior notice termination and maximum hours for regular 
workers. Against the more expensive and protected workers, student-workers needed: no 
prior notice before termination; weaker protection; more flexible – to meet seasonable 
production or fluctuations in the product demand. 
Secondly, student-labour was cheaper – as the costs of migrant labour had risen with 
increased legislation, organisation and pressures to raise wages due to labour shortages. In 
the case company formal employees qualified for a skill subsidy of 400 Yuan/month 
(US$63), while interns were not entitled to skill assessment or wage boost throughout the 
entire internship, even though interns and entry-level workers have the same starting wage 
of 950 Yuan/month (US$150). Moreover, interns were not eligible for productivity bonuses 
or quarterly prizes, regardless of how well they do their jobs. Although the case study 
company claimed to have taken out collective insurance for all interned student-workers, it 
was not possible to verify the numbers. Empirically all interviewed interns had not received 
information about an insurance policy. When they had a fever or a cold, the interviewed 
student interns simply visited local drug stores on their own, not knowing how to apply for 
company medical reimbursements, if they were entitled to any. The interviews showed that 
including overtime premiums, student workers earned between 1,705 Yuan and 2,480 Yuan 
a month (US$270-393), before deductions for food and lodgings.  
Thirdly, student-interns were attractive due to the mass or industrial scale of their 
recruitment. The building of institutionalised supply lines partially represented a re-
institutionalisation (a return to Danwei style functional dependencies between schools and 
factories) and partly a borrowing from German and Japanese systems – but there were also 
major differences, especially around the lack of continuity between the internship and the 
eventual job of the student. All 38 of our interviewees said they would not seek to work in 
their placement company after they had completed their studies. On the question of mass 
recruitment, the local governments in Jiangxi province assisted the case company to 
interview 24,208 persons and ultimately to hire 10,169 between August 2010 to January 
21 
 
2012. But the numbers of those who stayed on for a year was “extremely small” (Jiangxi 
Daily, 8 February 2012). In the face of persistently high turnover, the case company makes 
good use of its corporate power to negotiate with local governments to demand that 
schools supply interns to its production lines.  
Fourthly, the recruitment of student interns might be undermining of worker militancy, 
segmenting the total workforce by employment status, students can be considered ‘naive’ 
non-workers who weaken or dilute the resistance capacity of permanent workers. With few 
seeing the internship as a route into permanent employment in the company we examined, 
this also creates a detachment from work, and hence the avenues to defend labour rights. 
Against this there have been cases at Honda and other factories of student-interns 
participating in mass industrial action (Butollo and ten Brink 2012; Hui and Chan, 2012). 
Finally, traditional internships are part of the processes of recruitment and selection – used 
as a screening device to pick ‘good’ workers for the company. But as none of the students 
interviewed here wished to work in case company, this rationale does not seem to apply. 
Several students made the comment that had they wanted to work in the placement 
company they could have gone there directly and not as interned student labour. We would 
need more research – surveys of schools on the placement to analyse if there is any 
correlation between internship and final job of students once they have graduated. This 
finding is an inversion of conventional ideas about the internship, and on the one hand it 
seems to waste the opportunity for screening provided by a period of extended work 
experience, but on the other it is indicative of a more dominant logic to lower labour costs 
and increased flexibility within a labour market context where internees are not in short 
supply. 
Conclusion 
The model of internship discussed here is not sustainable. In the longer term the 
misalignment between the needs of the student and poor training offered, will reduce the 
attractiveness of VET. Others have highlighted functional problems with education and 
society in China (Rena et al., 2011). However these issues will not be settled simply with 
management being persuaded of the benefits of a satisfied workforce (Jiang, 2009). The 
findings here suggest that contract manufacturing firms in China are continuing to pursue 
low cost production: “much like their counterparts in other developing countries, Chinese 
factories seek a very specific type of employee: industrious, mobile, with low salary 
expectations, and willing to work long hours” (Jiang et al., 2009: 170).  Evidence from this 
research, suggests contract manufacturing firms in China face massive cost pressures from 
customers and these are passed on to their workers. The case study company makes good 
use of its corporate power to negotiate with local governments to demand that schools 
supply interns to its production lines. With governments providing grants for schools that 
meet the factory’s labour demands, and with teachers earning extra income for monitoring 
student interns, the ties between government, schools and the corporation appear strong. 
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However in conclusion, we would like to highlight some of the potential contradictions of 
the current arrangements.  
For teachers there is the welcome attraction of earning a second salary, but the media and 
public opinion have highlighted the conflicts of educators being transformed into factory 
supervisors, as this is seen to transgress professional pride, status and identity. Moreover, 
students expressed disillusionment with their particular teachers, who were “too close” to 
factory management, and did not look after their interests as students. Tensions within this 
divided identity remain unresolved. 
It is not sustainable to sell internships to students that are disconnected from classroom 
training and learning, as this also infringes basic principles of education and vocational 
training. But so long as the schools have to compete for state funds, and large firms wield 
investment power over local authorities, it seems that the interests of the employer will 
continue to pose a challenge to VET.  
Schools cannot be incorporated into capital without contradictions. Serving the interests of 
capital and not those of students, parents and human capital needs for Chinese 
development creates societal ambiguity between these stakeholders. Therefore it is likely 
that students, parents and schools will engage in power struggle with large employers over 
the specific needs of the different actors. 
For employers, involuntary labour is problematic for skill formation, for increased 
supervision and for motivation and morale. Asked if student workers were any different 
from migrant workers in their emotional behavior, one production manager said: 
If a student is found emotionally unstable or seriously ill, we can ask the responsible 
teacher to “take back” the student. In this way we avert the risk of suicide and 
monitor the labour conditions with the assistance of teachers. 
An emotionally unstable and often depressed workforce is more likely if recruitment is 
coerced or involuntary. Greater worker satisfaction is needed for long-term productivity, 
improved quality and sustainable production. A compliant, but stressed and “emotionally 
unstable” workforce does not seem to be an answer. A high volume and high flow of 
student interns creates productivity and quality problems for companies. We interviewed a 
team leader, Fenghui, who was sandwiched between management and the workers. “If 
something bad happens I get screwed; one level screws another.” He recounted the trouble 
created by mass recruitment of student interns:  
Several batches of student interns were dispatched to the workshop, with over a 
hundred interns in one batch. There were only four hundred people in the entire 
workshop. Having so many students come in at one time puts enormous pressure on 
the rate of defective products. Before that, there were just 3-4 defective products 
per day, but after they arrived, sometimes it was 20-30 items in an hour. 
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For Chinese society, institutionalised, involuntary student-labour reinforces China’s low skill 
model of development, and does not help with moving up the value chain. 
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